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Why Do Migrants Migrate? 
Self-Selection and Returns to 
Education in West Africa 
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and François Roubaud
Migration from and to African countries is extensive, with estimates ranging 
from about 16 million international African migrants according to the Inter-
national Organisation for Migration (IOM 2003) to 50 million according to 
the African Union (African Union 2005). West Africa in particular has a long 
history of population mobility, both regionally and internationally. Linked to 
factors as diverse as long-distance trade, plantation agriculture, and urbaniza-
tion as well as armed confl ict, land degradation, and drought, migration in the 
region played and still plays a major part in shaping settlement patterns. At the 
political level, several initiatives, including the free movement of people insti-
tutionalized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
have facilitated labor migration. With this background in mind, this chapter 
examines the locational choice of a large sample of Africans originating in seven 
cities in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).1 
Concern with migration emerged with the work of Sjaastad (1962). In the 
development literature, however, Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) 
were the fi rst to present a model in which the decision to migrate results from 
the rational comparison of the expected costs and benefi ts of migration. In 
both models, the diff erence in average expected earnings between countries or 
regions of destination and countries or regions of origin plays a key role and 
is predicted to have a positive eff ect on migration fl ows. Th is kind of model is 
unable to explain key stylized facts, however, such as migration fl ows from and 
to particular regions or countries. 
Borjas (1987) and Dahl (2002) adopt a diff erent approach, based on the semi-
nal paper of Roy (1951). In Roy’s framework, workers select into income-earning 
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activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. Applied to residential 
choice, this model explains migration not by average expected earnings diff er-
entials but rather by diff erences in individual expected returns to skills that are 
either observed or unobserved by the econometrician. As a result, migration 
fl ows are not necessarily one-sided. Th is literature argues that migrants’ self-
selection should be taken into account when estimating the returns to human 
capital in countries where the fl ow of migrants is signifi cant.
Estimation of this kind of model is usually very diffi  cult, however, because 
of the impossibility of gathering data on origin and destination labor markets 
at the same time. In this chapter, we take advantage of the fact that the 1-2-3 
surveys of the Programme d’Appui Régional à la Statistique (PARSTAT) project 
were conducted simultaneously, with the same questionnaire, thus providing 
the data needed to study migration choices in the region (for a description of 
these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview). Data on the country of birth and 
the last country of residence allow international migrants to be identifi ed within 
each national sample. 
Th is chapter is important for three reasons. First, it fi lls a gap in the knowl-
edge of cross-border migration within Africa. Second, it evaluates the extent of 
the bias in the estimated returns to education when international migration is 
not accounted for. Th ird, it determines whether earnings diff erentials matter in 
the choice of the country of residence. 
Th e model assumes that individuals are born randomly in one of the seven 
countries under review (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo) but rationally choose the country in which they reside by comparing 
the utility associated with each choice. Estimation of this model provides unbi-
ased estimates of the returns to education, together with the eff ect of expected 
earnings diff erentials on the probability of choosing a particular country. Given 
the data at hand, the universe of destination countries is restricted to countries 
that are close to one another geographically, legally, culturally, and economically. 
Th e seven countries studied share the same language (French), use a common 
currency (the CFA franc), and, most important, belong to ECOWAS, within 
which people are free to move and settle. 
We cannot account for migration movements outside the WAEMU region. 
Although this restriction is regrettable and constitutes a clear limitation of our 
study, it nevertheless makes sense to analyze migrants’ choice of destination in 
West Africa, where there are no legal barriers to migrate and most international 
migration takes place intraregionally. We fi nd that migration behavior plays 
an important role in determining earnings diff erentials between countries and 
between individuals with diff erent education levels. Our results also suggest that 
earnings diff erentials matter in locational choice.
Th is chapter is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section presents the data and 
some descriptive statistics. Th e second section specifi es the model and describes 
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the estimation strategy. Th e third section discusses the model identifi cation and 
the choice of variables. Th e fourth section provides the estimation results. Th e 
last section summarizes the chapter’s main conclusions.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Movements of labor are not a new phenomenon in West Africa. For genera-
tions, people have migrated in response to demographic, economic, political, 
and other factors, such as population pressure, environmental disasters, pov-
erty, and confl icts. 
Despite their importance, little is known about these migrations. Th e infor-
mation provided by census data; immigration and emigration statistics; and 
a small number of ad hoc surveys on the number, identity, and motivations 
of both inter- and intracontinental African migrants is spotty and unreliable. 
Evidence is even scarcer concerning transborder migrations within the West 
African subregion. How many transborder migrants are there in each West 
African country? Who are these migrants? What are their main motivations? 
Th ese are some of the questions this chapter addresses.
Th e data used are a pooling sample of the seven 1-2-3 surveys of the PAR-
STAT project. All seven French-speaking members of WAEMU belong to 
ECOWAS. At the time of its creation, in 1975, one of the key objectives of 
ECOWAS was to remove obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, and 
people in the subregion. In line with this objective, the Protocol on Free Move-
ment of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment was signed in 
May 1979; the right of entry was established in 1980 and the right of residence 
in 1986. In 2000, members of ECOWAS agreed to introduce a new passport 
for citizens of the subregion, which will gradually replace national passports. 
Although much remains to be done to achieve complete liberalization of labor 
migration within the community, these measures to create a borderless West 
Africa provide a good opportunity to study the residential choice of people 
within the community. 
We consider as migrants all individuals who meet the following three cri-
teria: they are not citizens of the country they reside in; they were not born 
in the capital city of the country they reside in; and they have not been resid-
ing continuously in the capital city since they were born.2 Individuals who are 
not migrants are considered natives. In the empirical analysis that follows, we 
restrict the sample to all active individuals 15–65 originating in one of the seven 
countries covered by the 1-2-3 surveys and residing in the capital city of one of 
these countries, either as natives or immigrants. 
As the fi gures in table 10.1 suggest, a wide variety of migration confi gurations 
is evident within WAEMU. Despite the severe sociopolitical crisis that started 
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Table 10.1 Composition of Samples Used to Analyze Migration in West Africa, 2001/02 
City
Number of immigrants from
Total number 
of immigrants
Total number 
of natives
Total sample 
sizeBenin Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo Other No data
Abidjan 53 446 256 90 72 87 310 133 1447 5,974 7,416
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 52 428 231 85 65 79 120 124 1184  
Bamako 8 14 11 8 12 0 62 8 123 7,148 7,272
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 3 13 10 6 11 0 36 6 85
 
Cotonou 3 6 15 58 3 102 138 18 343 6,994 7,337
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 3 6 15 55 2 100 38 16 235  
Dakar 11 0 2 9 0 4 130 53 209 11,773 11,977
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 7 0 2 9 0 1 74 35 128  
Lomé 88 9 9 11 50 3 113 23 306 5,927 6,254
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 87 9 8 11 44 3 24 21 207    
Niamey 76 49 4 122 5 59 52 26 393 7,710 8,106
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 67 49 4 119 5 48 27 23 342
 
Ouagadougou 11 7 8 2 1 16 18 11 74 8,198 8,251
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 6 7 7 0 1 16 5 7 49  
Total 247 521 39 421 208 96 268 823 272      
Of which WAEMU 
nationals 222 502 37 392 190 87 244 324 232      
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted in 2001/02 by the Observatoire 
économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT); Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation (DIAL); and national statistics institutes.
Note: All individuals 15–65 are considered as natives of country i if they always resided in country i, whether or not they identify themselves as citizens. Within the sample of immigrants 
coming from one of the six other WAEMU countries, some are not WAEMU nationals (for example, a French national who spent 10 years in Burkina Faso before moving to Benin is 
recorded as a migrant coming from Burkina Faso but is not Burkinabe). Groups considered in the analysis are in bold. WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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with the military coup of 1999 and resulted in reverse fl ows of migrants, Côte 
d’Ivoire is still by far the most important immigration country in the WAEMU 
region.3 Although migration fl ows from Burkina Faso and Mali have been fl uc-
tuating since the beginning of the crisis, these two neighboring countries remain 
the main source of migrants to Côte d’Ivoire. About 15 percent of Abidjan’s popu-
lation between 15 and 65 are immigrants, among which 74 percent are citizens of 
a WAEMU country (table 10.2).
By contrast, immigrants from bordering WAEMU countries account for only 
a marginal share of the population in Dakar, the capital of Senegal. Less than 
2 percent of Dakar’s inhabitants are non-Senegalese, among which a large share 
comes from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Th e Gambia, Mauritania, or Mali. Expa-
triates from Mali and Burkina Faso and living in the capital city of a WAEMU 
country largely outnumber the expatriates from WAEMU countries residing 
in Bamako or Ouagadougou, suggesting that the two countries remain major 
labor-exporting countries. By contrast, Benin, Niger, and Togo combine both 
emigration and immigration. 
Table 10.3 reports census statistics on immigrants by country of origin in 
each of the seven countries studied. Overall, the same general migration pat-
terns emerge: national data confi rm the position of Côte d’Ivoire as the main 
labor-importing country of the region, with most migrants coming from Mali 
or Burkina Faso. Th ey also confi rm the marginal participation of Senegal in 
 intraregional migration fl ows and the role of Benin, Niger, and Togo as both 
importers and exporters of labor. Th e picture for Burkina Faso, however, strongly 
diff ers from the one drawn based on data from Ouagadougou only. Rural Burkina 
Faso is indeed found to host a fairly large number of Malian migrants, who are 
not accounted for in our urban sample. Our inferences for Burkina Faso using 
data on Ouagadougou should thus be considered with caution. 
Table 10.2 Weighted Shares of Immigrants among Urban Residents in Seven Cities in West 
Africa, 2001/02
(percent)
Migrant status Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives 84.1 98.4 96.4 98.5 95.5 95.6 99.3
Immigrants 15.9 1.6 3.6 1.6 4.5 4.4 0.7
Of which:
From WAEMU 
country 73.5 43.8 60.6 13.0 60.7 85.7 70.7
From other 
developing country 25.2 43.4 36.4 83.9 38.8 12.2 23.9
From developed 
country 1.3 12.6 3.1 3.1 0.8 2.2 6.2
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union.
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Representativeness of Sample
It is likely that the migrants’ samples from the 1-2-3 surveys are not representa-
tive of the whole population of migrants, because they exclude individuals who 
moved out of their country to settle in a rural area of another WAEMU country. 
Th ese migrants may strongly diff er from the migrants recorded in our samples, 
especially with regard to their distribution by country of origin. 
Another issue possibly aff ecting the representativeness of our samples relates 
to the fact that immigrants are a relatively small share of the population and 
may cluster in some areas. Given the sampling frame of the 1-2-3 surveys, it is 
possible that such areas were missed when the census sectors were selected in 
the fi rst stage. Th is possibility cannot be ruled out in some cities. 
We believe our samples are representative in Abidjan, Bamako, and Lomé. 
In Lomé, where 125 of 129 census sectors were selected, the probability that we 
missed clusters of migrants is low. In Abidjan and Bamako, our estimates on 
the immigration rate at the level of the city and on the composition of migrants’ 
stocks by country of origin are very similar to the estimates obtained using 
census data. In addition, we used our representative samples of census sectors 
in each city to test the null hypothesis of random allocation of migrants across 
neighborhoods and rejected it in none of our samples. For other countries, the 
representativeness of the sample can be questioned.
Migrants’ Main Characteristics
Table 10.4 provides descriptive statistics on the main characteristics of 
natives and immigrants by city of residence. Several fi ndings are worthy 
of note. First, women are underrepresented in the immigrant populations of 
Abidjan, Ouagadougou, and Lomé but slightly overrepresented among the 
Table 10.3 Composition of Migrant Population in Seven Countries in West Africa, 2000
Country
Percentage of immigrants coming from
Total 
number of 
immigrantsBenin
Burkina 
Faso
Côte 
d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Benin 4.7 20.0 5.1 25.3 0.4 44.5 57,971
Burkina Faso 10.2 4.9 61.1 19.3 1.9 2.7 717,271
Côte d’Ivoire 3.7 58.8 29.3 7.8 0.2 0.1 1,661,157
Mali 18.8 49.4 3.2 17.8 4.5 6.3 22,529
Niger 15.9 17.1 7.8 55.3 1.3 2.5 60,922
Senegal 4.8 12.2 1.0 76.1 4.4 1.5 31,077
Togo 77.8 0.8 0.1 2.9 18.1 0.3 92,234
Total number 
of emigrants 221,362 1,006,194 52,335 987,480 305,471 20,198 50,121 2,643,161
Source: National census data circa 2000.
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Table 10.4 Mean Characteristics of Natives and Immigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated) 
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Men 47.6 61.5** 49.1 51.1 48.2 42.5 47.1 47.4 47.6 56.2** 48.6 43.5 50.7 54.1
Age (years) 29.0 34.6** 31.2 30.4 31.1 30.8 30.9 33.9 30.4 30.9 30.7 33.9** 30.2 30.4
Education and experience
Years of 
experience 16.4 26.6** 20.3 18.1 18.5 21.3 19.5 19.4 17.7 20.4** 19.6 25.5** 19.1 18.7
Years of 
schooling 6.6 2.0** 4.8 5.8 6.6 3.6** 5.3 8.6** 6.6 4.5** 5.1 2.3** 5.1 5.7
No diploma 44.7 83.5** 58.4 55.8 45.8 72.4** 60.2 31.6** 42.8 63.0** 60.9 81.5** 54.3 54.1
Completed 
primary 
education 27.6 10.2** 19.2 16.3 26.7 14.9** 18.5 15.8 31.9 24.7** 20.3 11.6** 24.6 13.5
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré) 10.4 2.7** 8.1 4.7 13.2 6.1** 11.0 21.1 14.7 5.6** 7.2 2.4** 11.3 18.9
Baccalauréat 4.8 0.6** 2.2 7.0** 4.0 3.9 3.8 5.3 3.2 1.2 2.6 0** 1.6 0
Can read and 
write in French 73.8 28.5** 49.2 51.2 71.6 37.0** 60.4 73.7 73.7 53.7** 56.5 29.8** 59.6 64.9
Can read and 
write in other 
language 25.0 10.9** 12.2 34.9** 24.5 26.5 19.3 47.4** 27.1 22.2 21.6 18.2 13.3 24.3**
Religion
Muslim 31.2 73.3** 97.2 79.1** 9.9 47.0** 93.3 57.9** 9.6 45.7** 98.2 76.4** 55.8 37.8** 
Catholic 35.9 17.8** 1.8 18.6** 67.2 31.5** 6.6 42.1** 47.6 24.7** 1.2 19.5** 36.2 18.9** 
Protestant 10.7 3.4** 0.5 2.3 5.2 3.9 0.1 0 10.2 0.6 0.4 3.4 ** 6.5 27.0** 
Number of 
observations 5,974 940 7,148 43 6,994 181 11,773 19 5,927 162 7,710 292 8,198 37
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level
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immigrant populations of Cotonou and Niamey. Traditional male-dominated 
short- to long-distance migratory streams in West Africa are thus becom-
ing feminized, suggesting a turnaround in traditional gender roles. Second, 
immigrants are signifi cantly older than natives in Abidjan, and Niamey but 
roughly of the same age as natives in the other cities. Th ird, immigrants 
appear to be less educated on average than natives in four cities (Abidjan, 
Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey). Th e education gap is particularly large in 
 Abidjan, where immigrants have 2.0 years of schooling on average against 
6.6 years for natives. 
Th e statistics for natives were computed using data collected in capital cit-
ies only. Some of them are thus likely to be bad proxies for the situation at the 
national level (mean education levels, for example, are generally much higher in 
urban areas than in rural ones). It should consequently come as no surprise that 
immigrants in Abidjan, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey (a majority of whom may 
come from rural areas) are on average less educated than nationals in these cit-
ies. Th e fact that in Bamako, Dakar, and Ouagadougou, immigrants appear to be 
more educated on average than natives suggests that these cities attract mainly 
educated people or people from urban areas. Because of the small sample size, 
however, the fi gure for Dakar should be taken with caution.
As a complement to table 10.4, table 10.5 provides some descriptive statistics 
on the main characteristics of natives (“stayers”) and emigrants (“movers”), by 
country of origin. In all countries except Togo and, to a lesser extent, Benin, men 
are overrepresented in the emigrant population. Intraregional migratory fl ows 
from these two countries are motivated mostly by commercial purposes and have 
traditionally been dominated by women. In terms of education, emigrants appear 
much less educated than nonmigrant natives in all countries, suggesting that 
migration fl ows within the WAEMU region mainly involve low-qualifi ed workers. 
Migrants’ Employment Status
On average, labor force participation is higher for immigrants than for natives.4 
Th e diff erence is particularly large in Abidjan and Niamey, suggesting that 
migration streams to these cities are motivated mainly by labor market consid-
erations. Given the individual characteristics of immigrants, particularly with 
respect to their level of education, one would expect their employment situation 
to be less favorable than that of natives in Abidjan, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey 
and more favorable in Dakar. In developing economies, formal wage workers in 
the public or private sector are considered to have a favorable employment situ-
ation; informal sector workers are considered to have an unfavorable situation. 
Th e fi gures in table 10.6 indicate that this is indeed the case. Th e percentage 
of immigrants working in the informal sector is much higher than the percent-
age of natives in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Lomé, and Niamey; it is lower in 
Dakar and Ouagadougou. 
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Table 10.5 Mean Characteristics of Natives and Emigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent, except where otherwise indicated)
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants Natives Emigrants
Men 47.6 54.1 49.1 57.4** 48.2 44.6 47.1 71.2** 47.6 38.5** 48.6 67.9** 50.7 58.4**
Age (years) 29.0 27.9 31.2 34.9** 31.1 32.8** 30.9 37.4** 30.4 30.2 30.7 31.7 30.2 34.7**
Education and experience
Years of 
experience 16.4 15.4 20.3 27.7** 18.5 21.5** 19.5 26.9** 17.7 20.0** 19.6 23.4** 19.1 27.0**
Years of 
schooling 6.6 6.5 4.8 1.2** 6.6 5.3** 5.3 4.1** 6.6 4.2** 5.1 2.3** 5.1 1.8**
No diploma 44.7 43.2 58.4 90.3** 45.8 55.9** 60.2 65.5 42.8 67.2 60.9 81.6** 53.3 86.5**
Completed 
primary 
education 27.6 21.6 19.2 6.4** 26.7 23.4 18.5 14.9 31.9 19.3** 20.3 11.6** 24.6 9.0**
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré) 10.4 8.1 8.1 1.0** 13.2 8.6** 11.0 6.9 14.7 7.0** 7.2 2.6** 11.2 2.2**
Baccalauréat 4.8 8.1 2.2 0.3** 4.0 0.9** 3.8 6.9 3.2 0.8** 2.6 1.1 1.6 0.4**
Can read and 
write in French 73.8 64.9 49.2 16.1** 71.6 57.2** 60.4 51.7 73.7 48.0** 56.5 27.9** 59.6 27.9**
Can read and 
write in another 
language 25.0 37.8** 12.2 13.3 24.5 18.9 19.3 21.8 27.1 18.0** 21.6 31.9** 13.3 8.2**
Religion
Muslim 31.2 51.4** 97.2 99.2** 9.9 25.2** 93.3 86.2 9.6 24.2** 98.2 96.3 55.8 69.5**
Catholic 35.9 16.2** 1.8 0.3** 67.2 38.7** 6.6 10.3 47.6 44.3 1.2 1.6 36.2 26.1**
Protestant 10.7 2.7 0.5 0.5 5.2 6.8 0.1 1.1** 10.2 12.3 0.4 0.5 6.5 2.2**
Number of 
observations 5,974 37 7,148 392 6,994 222 11,773 87 5,927 244 7,710 190 8,198 502
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 10.6 Employment Situation of Natives and Immigrants in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
(percent except where otherwise indicated)
Variable
Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Employment status
Employed 59.7 77.9 57.5 58.1 68.0 73.1 50.4 57.9 70.6 74.7 47.5 65.7 56.6 56.8
Unemployed 11.4 4.7 4.2 2.3 4.1 2.2 7.5 0.0 6.7 3.7 7.9 3.8 11.0 16.2
Inactive 28.8 17.5 38.4 39.5 27.9 26.5 42.1 42.1 22.6 21.6 44.6 30.5 32.3 27.0
Number of 
observations 5,974 940 7,148 43 6,994 181 11,773 19 5,927 162 7,710 292 8,198 37
Sector
Public sector 8.4 1.0 11.5 4.0 8.8 0.0 9.0 0.0 8.1 1.7 17.9 1.0 13.9 9.5
Formal 
private sector 21.4 12.7 11.7 8.0 11.6 10.9 17.6 36.4 8.2 12.4 13.6 10.4 9.0 19.1
Informal 
private sector 70.2 86.3 76.8 88.0 79.5 89.1 73.4 63.6 83.8 86.0 68.5 88.6 77.1 71.4
Wage
Hourly wage 
(CFA francs, 
purchasing 
power parity) 467 276 347 578 255 182 417 754 192 255 337 234 271 240
Number of 
observations 3,569 732 4,107 25 4,759 129 5,935 11 4,186 121 3,664 192 4,642 21
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
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Average hourly earnings follow roughly the same pattern. Compared with 
natives, immigrants earn much lower hourly wages in Abidjan (–41 percent), 
Niamey (–30 percent), and Cotonou (–29 percent); they earn much higher 
hourly wages in Dakar (91 percent), Bamako (67 percent), and Lomé (33 per-
cent).5 Lomé is an anomaly: although immigrants are less educated on average 
and more concentrated in the informal sector, they earn signifi cantly higher 
hourly wages than natives.
Model Speciﬁ cation and Estimation Strategy 
We take advantage of the simultaneity and strict comparability of the 1-2-3 
surveys to evaluate the impact of hourly wage diff erences in the seven cities 
on individuals’ residential choice. Th e econometric estimation is performed in 
three steps. First, using the pooled sample of 31,647 individuals observed in 
the seven cities, we estimate the determinants of individual residential choice, 
assuming that it refl ects comparison of the hourly wage that can be obtained in 
each destination city, together with other variables. More precisely, we assume 
that each individual i born in country j and living in city k derives utility from 
its choice of residence, written as 
 ui(j, k) = α.lnyik + z iʹ  fk + vi(j,k) (10.1)
with lnyik the logarithm of individual i hourly earnings in city k, and zi a vector 
of individual characteristics, such as religion. Individual i prefers to live in city 
k if doing so yields the highest utility: 
 ui(j, k) – c(j, k) ≥ ui(j, l) – c(j, l) for all l (10.2)
where c(j, k) is the cost of settling in city k when born in country j.6 Th ese costs 
cannot be observed. In the econometric estimation of the model, we use nation-
ality dummies to account for them, assuming that individuals originating from 
the same country face the same level of costs.
As individual hourly wages are observed only in the city of residence, equa-
tion (10.1) is estimated in a reduced form, obtained by replacing the logarithm 
of wage by a linear combination of its determinants:
 ui(j, k) = α  (xʹik  ak) + z iʹ  fk + ei(j, k) (10.3)
Under appropriate assumptions on the distribution of the error term, this 
model can be estimated as a multinomial logit. Th e estimated coeffi  cients can 
then be used to predict individual probabilities of residing in a given city.
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Second, we use the predicted probabilities computed in the fi rst step to cor-
rect for the self-selection of migrants in the hourly wage equation:
 lnyik = xʹik.ak + uik. (10.4)
Holding account of migrants’ self-selection is necessary because migrants 
could share some unobservable characteristics (such as motivation) that could 
be correlated with other observable determinants of wages (such as education). 
Following Dahl (2002), we correct for self-selection by adding to the wage equa-
tion a polynomial function of the choice probabilities computed in the fi rst 
step as a control for unobserved characteristics that would otherwise bias the 
estimates.
Th ird, we use hourly wages estimated for each individual in each country to 
evaluate the impact of expected wage diff erences on the probabilities of choice 
(that is, the value of coeffi  cient α in equation [10.1]).
Model Identiﬁ cation and Choice of Variables
In order to be identifi ed, our model relies on various assumptions, which need 
to be properly tested. In particular, in the second step of our procedure, in 
which we correct for individuals’ self-selection, it is important to include one 
or more variables that explain locational choice (that is, enter the fi rst-stage 
equation) but do not infl uence earnings. In what follows, we use dummies indi-
cating whether the individual’s father did not go to school or was absent when 
the individual was 15, together with dummies for the individual’s religion and 
nationality, as identifying variables. Religion is likely to have an infl uence on 
destination choice, given that the dominant religion is diff erent in diff erent cit-
ies. Nationality dummies are included to account for macro-level variables, such 
as average gross domestic product per capita, mortality rates, and the shares of 
immigrants from ECOWAS countries in the city’s population. Th ese variables 
also capture migration costs between the origin country and destination city. 
Any one of these exclusion restrictions could be violated. For example, if 
there is discrimination against people of a particular nationality or religion in 
a particular destination city, these variables would infl uence earnings. If the 
quality of education is diff erent for people from diff erent countries, nationality 
could also infl uence earnings by aff ecting schooling diff erences. We believe dis-
crimination on the basis of nationality or religion to be second-order concerns 
within the cities of our sample, and there is evidence that the quality of school-
ing does not diff er dramatically across countries of origin.7 
It could also be argued that father’s education and father’s presence in the 
household when individuals are 15 are correlated with household wealth, which 
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aff ects occupational choice and earnings. However, overidentifi cation tests do 
not reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between our instruments and 
the principal equation error terms in fi ve of seven cities. 
In the third stage of our procedure, identifi cation of the log-earnings coef-
fi cient in the structural model of residential choice depends on the exclusion 
from equation (10.1) of at least one variable that enters in the log-earnings 
equation (10.3). We assume that gender, education, and employment sec-
tor explain log-hourly earnings but not residential choice, once earnings are 
accounted for. Th ere are some good reasons why education might determine 
residential choice, apart from its impact on potential earnings. One possibil-
ity is that well-educated individuals prefer cities in which the average level of 
education is high, not only because their own wages are more likely to be higher 
but also because they will benefi t from positive externalities related to the high 
average level of education (such as a richer supply of cultural goods). In our 
sample, however, movers appear much less educated on average than stayers, 
in both origin countries’ capitals and destination cities. We therefore believe 
this incentive to be low. 
It could also be argued that people moving abroad experience a loss in utility 
because of the remoteness of their home country, extended family, and friends. Th is 
loss could induce a direct eff ect of the gender variable on locational choice, in addi-
tion to its indirect eff ect through earnings, if men (women) experience a greater loss 
than women (men). However, it is not clear whether the diff erence between men 
and women in this utility loss should be large, as both rely on networks of family 
and friends and may have similar preferences to remain in their home country. 
Excluding the employment sector from the locational choice decision does 
not seem too heroic an assumption given the strong similarities in the structure 
of urban labor markets (and in the share of public versus private and formal 
versus informal jobs in particular) in the seven cities.
In the earnings equation, the dependent variable is the logarithm of total 
hourly earnings in CFA francs. All earnings are expressed in purchasing power 
parity (PPP). Th e conversion to PPP CFA francs is necessary in the third step of 
our estimation, where expected earnings in the seven cities are allowed to infl u-
ence the probability of choice.8 Independent variables in the earnings equations 
are gender, education (as measured by the last diploma obtained), potential 
labor market experience and its square, the ability to speak French, the ability 
to speak another foreign language, dummies for the public or private formal 
sectors, and a series of dummies for the father’s activity when the individual 
was 15. Th is last set of variables is included both as a determinant of migration 
behavior and as a proxy for the individual’s sector choice, to account for earn-
ings diff erentials between sectors. Th e reduced-form multinomial logit model 
includes these variables, together with dummies for the individual’s religion 
and nationality. 
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As our estimation strategy is a multistep procedure, we bootstrapped the 
entire process with 50 replications. Bootstrapped standard errors were used for 
hypothesis testing.
Estimation Results
We fi rst present the results of the multinomial logit model before turning to the 
earnings equations and the structural model of residential choice. Th e section 
ends with some robustness checks. 
Reduced-Form Multinomial Logit of Residential Choice
Tables 10.7–10.9 present the estimation results. Table 10.7 shows the results of 
the reduced-form multinomial logit estimation. Th ese results are diffi  cult to 
comment on, because only the diff erences in the coeffi  cients with respect to the 
reference city (Dakar) can be identifi ed. Th us, for instance, the positive coef-
fi cient of the gender variable in the equation for Cotonou indicates that being 
Table 10.7 Reduced-Form Multinomial Logit Estimates of Individual Residential Choice in 
Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Gender (1 = male) 1.35*** 0.20 0.97*** 1.14*** 0.34 0.76**
(0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.31)
CEP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’études 
primaires)
–0.20 
(0.45)
–0.04
(0.51)
–0.67
(0.50)
–0.12
(0.49)
–0.35
(0.50)
0.43
(0.49)
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré)
–0.25
(0.58)
0.01
(0.71)
–1.06
(0.65)
–0.49
(0.65)
–0.79
(0.67)
0.87
(0.67)
CAP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’aptitude 
professionnelle)
0.60
(1.07)
1.77
(1.19)
–1.03
(1.17)
–1.04
(1.16)
0.08
(1.19)
1.73
(1.19)
BEP (Brevet 
d’études 
professionnelles)
–1.05
(1.95)
0.52
(1.91)
–3.20
(2.06)
–0.24
(2.00)
–0.81
(1.99)
1.09
(2.09)
Baccalauréat   1.10* 1.35 1.24 1.60** 1.37* 2.32***
(0.60) (0.88) (0.80) (0.77) (0.79) (0.89)
Foundation degreea  –0.43 0.21 –2.62 –1.49 –0.86 1.07
(1.77) (1.84) (1.82) (1.84) (1.85) (1.91)
Bachelor’s degree  –0.43 0.51 –1.53 –1.20 –0.07 0.84
(0.92) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (1.03)
Postgraduate 
degree
–4.88*** –3.85*** –5.51*** –5.45*** –3.99*** –4.01***
(1.06) (1.07) (1.02) (1.07) (1.06) (1.17)
(continued next page)
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Marital status 
(1 = married)
–0.83*** –0.08 –0.34 –0.45 –0.42 –0.65**
(0.30) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33)
Speaks French 
(1 = yes)
–0.29 –0.05 –0.16 0.22 0.22 –0.08
(0.34) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.37)
Speaks another 
language (1 = yes)
0.20 –0.08 1.19*** 1.06*** 0.23 0.07
(0.35) (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Experience (years) 0.16*** –0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08* 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Experience squared –0.002*** 0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector –1.60*** 0.26 –0.18 –0.29 –0.16 0.52
(0.59) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.66)
Private sector –0.17 0.28 0.14 –0.24 0.19 –0.84**
(0.35) (0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.38)
Father in 
agricultural sector
0.72** –0.41 0.12 0.20 –0.02 –0.07
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38)
Father in industrial 
sector
–0.05 –0.52 –0.85 –0.68 –0.40 –0.80
(0.52) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62)
Father in 
commercial sector
1.38*** 0.97** 0.81 1.15** 0.63 1.20***
(0.35) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41)
Father was senior 
executive
1.20** 1.27* 0.34 0.67 1.07 1.99**
(0.59) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73) (0.79)
Father was midlevel 
executive
0.02 0.61 0.48 –0.08 0.61 0.22
(0.58) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.66)
Father was absent 
at age 15
1.01** 0.69 1.47*** 1.14** 0.63 0.35
(0.48) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) (0.53)
Father never went 
to school
–0.59* –0.69* –0.56 –0.91** 0.10 0.31
(0.34) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37)
Father schooling 
missing
–4.62*** –2.79*** –7.09*** –3.75*** –3.05*** –3.72***
(0.65) (0.65) (0.77) (0.70) (0.68) (0.69)
Muslim –5.74*** –5.72*** –6.00*** –6.88*** –3.18* –5.55***
(1.78) (1.84) (1.80) (1.79) (1.84) (1.82)
Catholic –4.97*** –4.97** –4.15** –5.37*** –3.20* –4.57**
(1.80) (1.88) (1.82) (1.81) (1.86) (1.84)
Protestant –1.93 –2.65 –2.47 –3.39 –0.83 –0.92
(2.15) (2.25) (2.17) (2.16) (2.22) (2.19)
Intercept –1.62 –0.92 –3.98*** –2.35*** –6.01*** –4.83**
(1.94) (2.03) (2.21) (2.03) (2.10) (2.23)
Number of 
observations 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647 31,647
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: The dependent variable takes the value 1 (Cotonou) to 7 (Lomé), with 6 (Dakar) used as the comparison 
category. Nationality dummies were included but are not shown. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
University system derives from the French system, in which, until recently, second-year students could receive a 
diploma. This diploma is referred to here as the foundation degree. 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 10.7 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
316  URBAN LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
male has a larger eff ect on the utility resulting from choosing Cotonou than 
the utility resulting from choosing Dakar. Th e results suggest that, among the 
seven cities under review, holding a postgraduate degree or being Muslim or 
Catholic increases the utility of living in Dakar more than the utility of living in 
any other city. By contrast, holding a baccalauréat degree increases the utility of 
residing in Abidjan, Niamey, Ouagadougou, or Lomé by much more than that 
of residing in Dakar. Unsurprisingly, being of Senegalese nationality increases 
the utility of living in Dakar much more than that of living in any other city 
except Bamako, where the coeffi  cient is insignifi cant (results not shown).
Earnings Equation
Following Dahl (2002), we use the estimated coeffi  cients of the reduced-form 
multinomial logit to compute, for each observation of the sample, a polynomial 
of choice probabilities that was added to the set of explanatory variables in the 
earnings equations. Table 10.8 presents the ordinary least squares regression 
results. As the coeffi  cients of the polynomials of the selection probabilities have 
no interpretation, we limit the presentation to the coeffi  cients of the variables 
that have a direct interpretation. 
Th e fi rst column shows the estimated coeffi  cients when no correction for 
endogenous selection is made. Th e second column presents the corrected 
coeffi  cients. Th e results of a series of Wald tests are shown at the bottom of 
the table. 
We computed several test statistics. First, we tested whether the selection 
correction terms enter the earnings equation signifi cantly. Second, we tested 
the hypothesis that the excluded variables (father, religion, and nationality dum-
mies) make no signifi cant contribution to the explanation of the dependent 
variable.
Tests confi rm that the model is correctly identifi ed. With the exception of 
Bamako and Lomé and the father dummies, the Wald test statistics are insig-
nifi cant, indicating that the vector of variables used to instrument residential 
choice does not contribute to the determination of earnings once the correction 
terms are included. For Bamako and Lomé, including the father dummies as 
explanatory variables did not change the results signifi cantly. 
As for the correction functions, in four cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
and Lomé), we can reject the hypothesis that the coeffi  cients of the polynomi-
als included to correct for endogenous selection are all zero, suggesting that 
holding account of migrants’ self-selection aff ects the estimation of earnings 
equations in these cities. In no case, however, does adjusting for self-selection 
change the returns to education enough that the adjusted coeffi  cients lie outside 
the confi dence intervals for the unadjusted estimates. Th is result suggests either 
that, given the relatively small number of migrants in our samples, selection 
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Table 10.8 Ordinary Least Squares Log-Earnings Regressions for Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
Gender (1 = male) 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.46*** 0.45*** –0.15*** –0.18*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.41*** 0.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
CEP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’études 
primaires)
0.55*** 0.55*** 0.21*** 0.23** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.45***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
BEPC (Brevet 
d’études du 
premier cycle du 
second degré)
1.17***
(0.10)
1.19***
(0.08)
0.53***
(0.11)
0.56***
(0.13)
1.00***
(0.09)
0.94***
(0.09)
0.58***
(0.09)
0.57***
(0.09)
1.11***
(0.10)
1.13***
(0.10)
1.07***
(0.14)
1.08***
(0.13)
1.31***
(0.11)
1.30***
(0.12)
CAP (Certiﬁ cat 
d’aptitude 
professionnelle)
1.21***
(0.20)
1.19***
(0.16)
0.48***
(0.12)
0.54***
(0.13)
1.17***
(0.15)
1.07***
(0.16)
0.72***
(0.25)
0.74***
(0.14)
1.10***
(0.23)
1.24***
(0.21)
1.48***
(0.23)
1.42***
(0.18)
1.18***
(0.18)
1.19***
(0.16)
BEP (Brevet 
d’études 
profesionnelles)
1.13***
(0.20)
1.03***
(0.14)
0.98***
(0.11)
1.03***
(0.12)
0.95**
(0.47)
0.74**
(0.35)
0.86***
(0.26)
0.85***
(0.20)
1.34***
(0.24)
1.31***
(0.18)
1.30***
(0.20)
1.22***
(0.20)
1.74***
(0.25)
1.76***
(0.25)
Baccalauréat 1.71*** 1.66*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 1.37*** 1.35*** 0.97*** 1.05*** 1.64*** 1.63*** 1.90*** 1.90*** 1.85*** 1.86***
(0.15) (0.11) (0.20) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16)
Foundation 
degreea
2.08*** 2.08*** 1.00*** 1.06*** 2.14*** 1.94*** 1.17*** 1.14*** 2.72*** 2.74*** 1.90*** 1.82*** 2.14*** 2.10***
(0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24)
Bachelor’s degree 2.30*** 2.26*** 1.42*** 1.49*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 2.53*** 2.58*** 2.26*** 2.16*** 2.41*** 2.41***
(0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12)
Postgraduate 
degree
1.81*** 1.73*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.74*** 1.61*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 2.20*** 2.27*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 1.62*** 1.65***
(0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.27) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.23) (0.22)
Marital status 
(1 = married)
0.28*** 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.41***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
(continued next page)
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Speaks French 
(1 = yes)
0.06 0.06 0.21*** 0.21** 0.14** 0.15* 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.08 0.07 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Speaks another 
language (1 = yes)
0.19** 0.17*** 0.13** 0.08 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.17* 0.32*** 0.34***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Experience (years) 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience squared –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector 0.69*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.66*** 0.76***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Private sector 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.47***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Father in 
agricultural sector
–0.08 –0.05 –0.11** –0.18*** –0.02 –0.06 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.21*** –0.29***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
Father in industrial 
sector
–0.22** –0.19** –0.06 –0.06 0.15 0.10 –0.11 –0.12 –0.04 –0.02 –0.19 –0.21 –0.32** –0.37*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19)
Father in 
commercial sector
–0.05 –0.02 0.10* 0.11* 0.06 0.01 0.01 –0.02 0.10 0.08 –0.13 –0.11 0.01 –0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Father was senior 
executive
0.35** 0.35** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.28** 0.19 0.26** 0.27** 0.17 0.18 –0.20 –0.23 0.24 0.21
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.16)
Father was 
midlevel executive
–0.12 –0.18* 0.15** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.09 0.10 –0.01 –0.01 –0.05 –0.07 0.09 0.12
(0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Table 10.8 (continued)
Variable Abidjan Bamako Cotonou Dakar Lomé Niamey Ouagadougou
319
Number of 
observations 4,239 4,239 4,052 4,052 4,736 4,736 5,430 5,430 4,245 4,245 3,701 3,701 4,471 4,471
R-squared 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.32 0.44 0.44 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40
Wald test for 
selection correction 
terms 10.60* 11.00* 17.30*** 5.54 28.00*** 6.49 6.02
Overidentiﬁ cation Wald tests
Father dummiesb 3.86 8.07** 1.64 1.05 10.10** 2.03 1.63
Religion dummies 3.22 0.33 3.41 0.90 3.44 1.70 0.59
Nationality 
dummies 5.48 2.45 4.61 0.02 7.17 7.60 7.72
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: Figures show uncorrected and corrected estimates. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
a. University system derives from the French system, in which, until recently, second-year students could receive a diploma. This diploma is referred to here as the foundation degree. 
b. Father was absent when individual was 15; father had no schooling; father schooling is missing.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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does not strongly bias the estimated returns to education or that our control 
functions do not do much to correct for the type of selectivity that matters. 
In Abidjan, Cotonou, and Niamey, the corrected coeffi  cients are lower than 
the uncorrected coeffi  cients, suggesting that migrants to these cities share unob-
served characteristics that make their earnings higher than the host city average. 
Th e opposite is found in Bamako and Lomé. Th ese results have no implications 
for migrants’ positive or negative selection. Indeed, migrants could have lower 
than average earnings in their host city but still earn more than they would 
have in the capital of their country of origin. In order to check whether earn-
ings diff erentials matter in locational choice, we need to estimate the model in 
its structural form.
Comparing returns to education shows large diff erences across cities. In 
Bamako, and to a lesser extent Dakar, returns to education seem much lower 
than in the other cities. Th e increase in returns by grades does not appear 
very steep either. In Bamako, having completed primary school yields an 
estimated increase in hourly earnings of only 23 percent over uneducated 
individuals, a much lower estimate than in Abidjan (about 55 percent). In 
all cities, the largest returns are for bachelor’s degrees. Th e smallest increase 
is in Bamako (114 percent over uneducated individuals) and the largest in 
Lomé (227 percent).
Structural Model of Residential Choice
Do earnings diff erentials aff ect locational choice? Table 10.9 presents the results 
of the conditional logit estimation (equation 10.1). With no correction for 
endogenous selection, the coeffi  cient is small and weakly signifi cant. Its size 
more than doubles and becomes very signifi cant when we correct for endog-
enous selection, bringing support to the idea that individuals tend to locate in 
countries where their expected earnings are higher. 
Table 10.9 Structural Model Estimates of Individual Residential 
Choice in Seven Cities in West Africa, 2001/02
Model Estimated value of `
Uncorrected 0.31*
(0.16)
Corrected 0.78***
(0.15)
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 
10.1 for details).
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.
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A second assessment of this notion is given by simulations that compare 
wages between origin and destination countries. We simulated these diff erences 
using the following procedure:
• Step 1: For each individual, compute the predicted value of the (log) average 
hourly income in each city.
• Step 2: For each individual, draw a value in the standard normal distribution.
• Step 3: For ea ch individual i and city k, combine the results of steps 1 and 2 
to compute the predicted value of the individual’s (log) hourly income in city 
k, summing the predicted average with the random term multiplied by the 
estimated standard deviation of (log) wages in that city. 
• Step 4: Repeat steps 2 and 3 100 times. For “movers,” compute m, the pro-
portion of individuals for whom the predicted hourly income is higher in 
their current city than in the capital of their country of origin. For “stayers,” 
compute the average value of predicted hourly income in the cities in which 
they chose not to reside. Th en compute s, the proportion of individuals for 
whom the average value of predicted hourly income is lower in the cities in 
which they chose not to reside than in their country of origin.
Table 10.10 shows the results of this exercise. For movers (stayers) in each 
city, it reports the proportion of individuals for whom m (s) exceeds 50 percent. 
In Bamako, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou, our model does a good job of predict-
ing that movers live in cities in which their hourly income is higher than in 
their city of origin. In Bamako in particular, income diff erentials seem to play 
an important role. Th e model also does a good job of predicting stayers in Abi-
djan, Bamako, Dakar, and Niamey. Th e model fails to predict the destination of 
movers from Dakar and Lomé and of stayers in Cotonou. Th e fact that it fails 
Table 10.10 Model Simulation Results of Moving and Staying in Seven Cities in 
West Africa, 2001/02 
City
Percentage of movers 
for whom m > 50 
Percentage of stayers 
for whom s > 50
Cotonou 85 1
Ouagadougou 90 24
Abidjan 50 59
Bamako 81 63
Niamey 23 83
Dakar 7 68
Lomé 8 31
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table 10.1 for details).
Note: m = proportion of individuals for whom predicted hourly income is higher in current city than 
in capital of country of origin. s = proportion of individuals for whom average value of predicted 
hourly income is lower in cities in which they chose not to reside than in country of origin.
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to predict the behavior of workers in some cities should not be surprising, as 
potential income diff erentials are not the only motive for migration. Given that 
income is just one factor among many, the ability of the model to predict work-
ers’ choice based on potential income diff erentials is surprisingly good. 
For movers, we computed the diff erence between the predicted value of hourly 
earnings in the origin country capital and destination city; for stayers, we com-
puted the diff erence between the predicted value of hourly earnings in the origin 
country capital and an average of the predicted value of hourly earnings that could 
be obtained in the six potential destination cities. We then computed the average 
value of these diff erences separately for movers and stayers. Th e diff erence is close 
to zero (–0.36) for stayers, suggesting that for these people there is no real gain of 
moving abroad. In contrast, movers earned much higher hourly earnings abroad 
(–3.99) than they would have earned had they stayed in their country of origin. 
Robustness Checks
We conducted several robustness checks. First, in the second stage of our estima-
tion procedure, we ran a Heckman selection model using data on labor market 
participants and nonparticipants instead of an ordinary least squares regression 
on participants only. In the early estimations, because of the diffi  culty of control-
ling for both the endogenous selection of locational choice and labor force partic-
ipation, we restricted the sample to labor market participants. Th is limitation is a 
potential source of bias in our estimates. Th e identifying variable in the Heckman 
selection model is whether the individual is married, which is assumed to infl u-
ence labor market participation but not earnings. Results obtained in the third 
stage were not aff ected by this change, suggesting negligible biases. Second, we 
checked whether self-selected internal migration aff ected the observed returns 
to education. We found no evidence of selection bias. Th ird, as our results might 
depend on the set of conversion factors used to convert current CFA francs into 
purchasing power parity values, we reran the model using World Bank (2003) 
conversion factors. Th is modifi cation did not change the results signifi cantly.
Conclusion
Our results shed light on migration fl ows within the WAEMU region. Despite 
the severe political crisis that began in 1999, Côte d’Ivoire remains the most 
important destination country in the subregion. Mali and Burkina Faso remain 
major labor-exporting countries, largely toward Côte d’Ivoire. Benin and Togo 
combine emigration and immigration. 
Migrants tend to be less educated than nonmigrants, in both their origin and 
destination countries. Cross-border migration within the subregion thus seems 
to concern mainly people with low levels of education, who are more likely than 
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natives to work in the informal sector and receive lower wages. Not accounting 
for international migration in estimating returns to education yields upward 
biased estimates in three of seven countries and downward biased estimates 
in two others. However, disparities in returns to education between cities do 
not vanish, suggesting that country-specifi c amenities and other unobservable 
nonwage variables play important roles in the locational choice of individuals 
with diff erent levels of education. 
We also fi nd that expected earnings diff erentials have a very signifi cant eff ect 
on choice probabilities: everything else equal, people tend to live in cities in 
which their expected earnings are higher than elsewhere. Our sample is not a 
random sample of individuals from the WAEMU region, and we do not include 
all potential destinations. Th ese caveats notwithstanding, our results on the 
locational choice of a large sample of West Africans suggest that individuals in 
developing countries do not always deviate from the predictions of the standard 
economic model.
Notes
 1. WAEMU includes eight countries: the seven under review in this chapter (Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) and Cape Verde. 
ECOWAS is a larger group of countries. It includes all WAEMU countries as well as 
Th e Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
 2. Although Abidjan and Cotonou are not the administrative capitals of Côte d’Ivoire 
and Benin, we refer to them as capitals because they are the most important cities in 
economic terms (Cotonou is also the seat of government). 
 3. Th e civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started in September 2002, a few months aft er comple-
tion of the 1-2-3 survey.
 4. Th e unemployment rates reported in tables 10.6 and table 1.6 in chapter 1 diff er, 
for two reasons. First, table 1.6 covers only the active population, whereas table 
10.6 includes inactive individuals. Second, table 10.6 is restricted to people 15–65, 
whereas table 1.6 covers everyone 10 and older. 
 5. Figures for Bamako and Dakar should be considered with great care given the small 
sample size.
 6. All sampled individuals were born in one of the seven countries under review. 
We assume that they chose to live in one of the capitals of these countries; the 
model is built to analyze the determinants of this choice. Th roughout the rest of 
the chapter, we distinguish between countries of origin and cities of destination 
or residence.
 7. Indeed, according to UNESCO’s (2005) Education for All 2005 Monitoring Report, 
which provides various indicators of the quality of education, none of the seven 
countries of concern stands out from the crowd. For instance, Benin ranks fi rst when 
the quality of education is measured by the probability of being literate aft er six years 
of primary school but fourth when quality is measured by test scores and seventh 
when measured by the average teacher wage. 
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 8. Th e PPP conversion factors were computed in 1998 by the Agence pour la Sécurité 
de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique (ASECNA) and updated through 2001 using 
national infl ation rates.
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